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Abstract: Informality is a wide-spread phenomenon across the globe.  We show that firms in 
countries with better information sharing systems and greater financial sector outreach evade 
taxes to a lesser degree, an effect that is stronge for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and 
towns, and firms in industries relying more on external financing, with higher liquidity needs 
and with greater growth potential. However, it is variation in firm size that dominates firm 
variation in location and industry variation in explaining cross-firm and cross-country 
variation in tax evasion. This effect is robust to controlling for an array of other measures of 
the financial and institutional environment firms face.   The effect is also robust to controlling 
for fixed firm effects in a smaller panel dataset of Central and Eastern European countries 
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1. Introduction  
A growing literature dating back to King and Levine (1993) demonstrates the 
important connections between financial development and growth. Research in this area 
generally finds that financial intermediary development exerts a first-order impact on 
economic growth (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; 
Beck and Levine, 2002). This important link has spurred further exploration into the various 
channels through which the financial development influences the real side of the economy.1 
More recently, the focus has shifted from financial depth to financial penetration and access 
to finance by households and small enterprises (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 
2007; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  This paper asses es the impact of credit information 
sharing and financial sector outreach on the incidence and extent of informality across firms 
and across countries.  
Existing studies in the finance and growth literatue examine the links between 
financial development and formal economic activities. Noticeably absent in this literature is 
an examination of the links between financial interm diary development and informal 
(unofficial) economic activities.2  The omission is somewhat surprising given the 
pervasiveness of informality amongst firms in develop d and developing countries alike, and 
given the potentially important effect of informality on economic growth. According to 
estimates by Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000), the 
size of the unofficial economic activities as a proportion of GDP ranges from 10-15% in 
developed countries and 19-46% in developing countries, and reaches in some cases, such as 
Cameroon or Croatia, the staggering figure of 60% or m re. As Johnson et al. (2000) point 
out, informality can impede economic growth in several ways. First, firms operating 
                                                
1 In this spirit, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that the level of financial intermediary development exerts 
a large and positive impact on total factor productivity growth, which feeds through to overall economic growth. 
Love (2003) provides evidence that financial development reduces firms’ financing constraints. Raddatz (2006) 
find that financial development has a large causal effect in the reduction of industrial output volatility. Using the 
banking crises as natural experiments, Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel (2007) find that more financially 
dependent sectors tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in 
countries with deeper financial systems than countries with shallower financial system.  For a detailed r view of 
the literature, we refer to Levine (2005). 




informally cannot make good use of market-supporting institutions and are therefore subject 
to underinvestment problems. Second, doing business in ecret may generate further 
distortions because of the efforts in avoiding detection and punishment. Furthermore, the 
hidden resources may not find their most productive us s. In fact, a series of high profile 
sector studies by the McKinsey Global Institute conclude that “in Portugal and Turkey, for 
instance, informality accounts for nearly 50% of the overall productivity gap with the United 
States” (Farrell, 2004). Third, high aggregate informality costs the government tax revenues 
and therefore might cause the under-provision of public infrastructure and services, which 
will impede economic growth (Johnson et al., 2000; Loayza, 1996). Other authors question 
the negative effect of informality on growth, pointing to informality as a second-best 
response to institutional deficiencies and/or high taxation (Sarte, 2000). The relationship 
between informality and growth might therefore be non-linear and the optimal level of 
informality not zero.  Firm-level evidence, however, suggests that informality in developing 
countries is growth impeding rather than growth enhancing (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).    
Hence, understanding the relationship between financial intermediary development 
and informality helps understand an additional channel through which financial development 
can impact the real sector. Our paper aims to fill this gap by exploring in detail the role that 
financial sector outreach plays in explaining cross-country and cross-firm variation in the 
incidence and extent of informality and tax evasion. Specifically, we focus on two 
dimensions capturing the outreach dimension of financial sector development: credit 
information sharing and physical banking sector outeach.  
The existing literature suggests several channels through which financial sector 
outreach might affect corporate tax evasion. First, Johnson et al. (2000) point out that firms 
are more likely to hide output in economies with underdeveloped market-supporting 
institutions because they gain little from being formal. In this spirit, Straub (2005) develops a 
model in which firms face a choice between formality and informality.  Using this framework, 
he shows that better access to formal credit services increases the benefits of formality. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) find that bnking sector outreach helps reduce 
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firms’ financing obstacles. Furthermore, as documented in the recent literature, credit 
information sharing is associated with lower transaction costs (Miller, 2003), improved 
availability and lower cost of credit to firms (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009), lower level 
of corruption in bank lending to firms (Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song, 2009) and higher level of 
bank risk taking (Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010). Overall, this would imply higher benefits 
from formality in economies with more effective credit information sharing and higher 
branch penetration by gaining access to the formal fin ncial sector.  
Second, in order to evade the taxes, firms inevitably need to manipulate their financial 
information (“cook the books”). As documented in the literature, firms suffer significant 
reputation losses and incur much higher financing costs due to their illegal misconduct such 
as corporate misreporting (e.g., Graham, Li and Qiu, 2008). From a bank’s perspective, tax 
evasion creates uncertainty about the credibility of financial statements and signals low 
quality of disclosed company information and other aspects of the firm's operations.3 In 
addition, tax evasion is usually associated with significant legal liabilities, further worsening 
future prospects of the firms and increasing the default risks. As a result, the perceived 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders increases with higher tax avoidance. 
The increased information asymmetry, in turn, affects banks’ lending decisions and requires 
banks to monitor firms more intensively. The higher costs are passed along to borrowers in 
the form of reduced credit availability, higher interest rates and more stringent loan terms 
(Graham et al., 2008). In an economy with higher branch penetration and better credit 
information sharing, the information of corporate misconduct can be more easily observed 
and shared among all other potential lenders, which in turn will make it more difficult and/or 
more expensive to receive future loans (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002).4 Hence, the opportunity 
costs of engaging in tax evasion would be higher in countries with higher branch penetration 
and better credit information sharing mechanisms. The aforementioned channels suggest that 
                                                
3 The reputation losses might also affect the firm’s investors, customers, and suppliers and change the t rms of 
trade on which they do business with the firm. This m ght further affects the firm’s value by reducing the 
present value of firm’s future cash flows (Graham et al, 2008). 
4 In fact, tax information is often collected by credit registries or private bureaus and shared among financial 
institutions (Miller, 2003). 
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firms in countries with higher branch penetration ad better information sharing have 
stronger incentives to operate formally since both the benefits of formality and the costs of 
informality are higher in these countries.  
However, there might be a countervailing effect. As well documented in the literature, 
the collateral value is also an important determinant of access to finance and the loan terms. 
In the case of tax evasion and informality, the more wealth a firm hides, the less collateral it 
can offer for securing a loan and the worse is the likelihood of getting access to credit with 
reasonable terms and conditions. As shown by Blackburn, Bose and Capasso (2009), the 
marginal net benefit of tax evasion thus decreases with easier access to credit.  This effect 
might be strongest for the informationally opaque firms since such firms could credibly 
commit to lower asset substitution by providing collateral (Stulz and Johnson, 1985; 
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). In economies with better credit information sharing and higher 
branch density, however, the presence of collateral might be less important to creditors 
because the information gap between creditor and borrower is smaller and because creditors 
can monitor the firms more effectively.5 In this regard, the likelihood of access to finance 
might be less sensitive to the change of the collateral values in economies with better credit 
information sharing and higher branch density, while at the same time, the benefits of getting 
access to finance would be higher in these countries. Therefore, the overall opportunity costs 
of tax evasion, from this perspective, may be either igher or lower in more financially 
developed countries, which leaves the question for our empirical tests. 
Using a unique dataset across 43 countries and over 22,000 firms, we examine the 
relationship between banking sector outreach, credit information sharing and corporate tax 
evasion. We find very strong evidence that credit information sharing and banking sector 
outreach are significantly and negatively associated with the incidence and extent of tax 
evasion, suggesting that the net effect of financial sector outreach on corporate tax evasion 
                                                
5 As Holmstrong and Tirole point out (p.665), “Firms with low net worth have to turn to financial intermediaries, 
who can reduce the demand for collateral by monitori g more intensively. Thus, monitoring is a partial 
substitute for collateral”.  This is empirically confirmed by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2010) 
who show that banks are less likely to use collateral for small and medium enterprises in developed than in 
developing countries.  
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tends to be negative and significant. This result is robust to controlling for a standard 
indicator of financial depth and for an array of other indicators of the institutional framework 
firms operate in.  
Using the same analytical framework as above, we conje ture that the relative 
benefits and costs of access to formal financial servic s vary across firms of different sizes as 
well as locations.6  Smaller firms and firms in smaller cities and towns stand to benefit more 
from gaining access to formal finance than large firms and firms closer to the economic 
center of a country.7  Similarly, firms that depend more on external finance for technological 
reasons, such as a long gestation period or indivisibility of investment, as well as firms with 
higher growth opportunities, benefit more from access to formal finance than others (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Houston et al., 2010). We should therefore observe a stronger 
relationship between credit information sharing andbanking sector outreach, on the one hand, 
and tax evasion, on the other hand, for smaller firms, firms in smaller towns and firms that 
rely more on external finance and have higher growth opportunities. Our empirical results 
strongly confirm our expectations. The relationship between credit information sharing, 
banking sector outreach and corporate tax evasion i indeed stronger for smaller firms, firms 
in smaller cities, and firms in industries more dependent on external finance, with higher 
liquidity needs and higher growth opportunities. However, it is variation in firm size that 
dominates firm variation in location and industry variation in explaining cross-firm and cross-
country variation in tax evasion. 
As final robustness test, we confirm our results for a more limited sample of 897 firms 
across 26 Central and European countries, many of which introduced credit registries or 
upgraded them in the early 2000s.  These firms were interviewed in 2002 and 2005 so that we 
can directly observe whether there is a relationship between changes in the quality of credit 
information sharing and firms’ tax evasion.  We confirm our results both for the level and the 
differential effect of credit information sharing on tax evasion, further alleviating concerns of 
                                                
6 Straub (2005) shows how the threshold size, above which a firm decides to become formal, varies with 
different institutional and financial constraints. 
7 For the relative effect of financial sector depth on the growth of small vs. large firms, see Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2005). 
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simultaneity and endogeneity biases.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, this is the first 
paper, to our best knowledge, that links specific dimensions of financial sector outreach, i.e. 
credit information sharing and branch penetration, t  the incidence and extent of informality.  
The empirical findings shed light on an important channel (i.e. reducing informality) through 
which financial intermediary development can improve economic growth.  While previous 
work had to rely mostly on aggregate financial depth indicators such as total credit in an 
economy, financial penetration through banking sector outreach has only recently become a 
topic of interest, mainly due to the availability of data (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez 
Peria, 2007). In this study, we use data on branch penetration per capita and per square km to 
capture the geographic proximity of bank outlets to enterprises (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Martinez Peria, 2007). We thus contribute to the exploration of the real economy effects of 
banking sector outreach, beyond financial depth.  
Second, this paper is related to a small but growing literature on credit information 
sharing. In their theoretical work, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that information sharing 
reduces adverse selection by improving the pool of borrowers. It can also reduce moral 
hazard risk through its incentive effects on curtailing imprudent borrower behavior (Padilla 
and Pagano, 1997). Using cross-country data, Jappelli and Pagano (2002) find that the 
breadth of credit markets is associated with information sharing. More recently, Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007) find that both creditor protections through the legal system and 
information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to GDP 
using country-level data in 129 countries. Using firm-level data, Brown, Jappelli and Pagano 
(2009) show that credit information sharing reduces firms’ financing obstacles and increases 
external financing, while Barth et al. (2009) show that it helps reduce corruption in lending. 
Our paper adds to the literature by finding evidence that information sharing is also an 
effective device in curbing corporate tax evasion. 
Third, the study is related to the determinants of informality, most of which focus on 
specific factors that can explain informality such as high tax rate, burdensome regulation, 
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corruption, organized crime and inadequacy of the institutional environment (e.g. Johnson 
and Shleifer, 1997; Johnson et al, 1998, 2000;  Friedman et al., 2000; Botero et al., 2004; 
Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste, 2008). We add to this literature by showing that credit 
information sharing and financial sector outreach are important determinants of informality. 
 While our paper offers novel insights and results, some caveats are due.  First, our 
results come mostly from cross-sectional variation and although we control for an array of 
other financial sector and institutional indicators, we can therefore not completely exclude the 
possibility of omitted variable bias. We mitigate this concern, however, by testing for the 
differential effect of information sharing and banking sector outreach on firms of different 
sizes, locations and financing needs, by employing a  instrumental variable analysis, and by 
using firm-level fixed effects analysis for a smaller sample of countries.   Second, our 
measures of information sharing and banking sector out each are proxies for the actual 
possibility of firms to access formal financial institutions for credit, savings and transaction 
services and thus subject to measurement bias. Previous research, however, has shown that 
the quality of credit information sharing and banking sector outreach is associated with lower 
financing constraints of firms (Beck et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009).  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and 
methodology. Section 3 discusses our results and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
 In order to test the impact of financial sector outreach on the pervasiveness of tax 
evasion, we combine firm-level data from the World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys with 
indicators of financial sector depth, breadth and infrastructure as well as other 
macroeconomic indicators.  This section discusses th  different data sources and variables we 
will be utilizing and the methodology.  
 
2.1 Data 
We use data from the World Bank-IFC Enterprise Surveys to measure both the degree 
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of tax evasion and construct an array of firm-level control variables. The Enterprise Surveys 
have been conducted over the past eight years in over 100 countries with a consistent survey 
instrument.8 The surveys try to capture business perceptions on the most important obstacles 
to enterprise operation and growth, but also include detailed information on management and 
financing arrangements of companies.    Sample sizes vary between 250 and 1,500 companies 
per country and data are collected using either simple random or random stratified sampling.  
The sample includes formal enterprises of all sizes, different ownership types and across 26 
industries in manufacturing, construction, services and transportation.  Firms from different 
locations, such as capital city, major cities and small towns are included. 
The use of firm-level survey data in cross-country work has become increasingly 
popular in recent years and has several decisive adantages over the use of aggregate 
country-level data.9  First, the dataset provides very unique and direct evidence on firm-level 
corporate tax evasion, which is not available in aggre ate numbers that are mostly 
extrapolated (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste, 2008).  Second, we are able to explore 
within-country variation in tax evasion across firms of different types. Specifically, we will 
be able to compare firms of different sizes and in ifferent locations, as well as firms from 
industries with different financing needs, thus notonly getting closer to the issue of causality 
by applying a difference-in-difference approach, but also testing more specific mechanisms. 
Third, by utilizing firm-level data, we are able to c ntrol for cross-country differences in the 
composition of corporate sectors, which might cause a spurious correlation in aggregate 
regressions.  
We use data from 65 surveys across 43 countries over the period 2002 to 2005. 18 
countries have conducted two surveys, while two countries have conducted three surveys; the 
                                                
8 See www.enterpriseseurveys.org for more details. Similar surveys were previously conducted under the 
leadership of the World Bank and other IFIs in Africa (REPD), the Central and Eastern European transitio  
economies (BEEPS) in the 1990s and world-wide in 2000 (World Business Environment Survey).  
9 Among the many studies using firm-level surveys, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) show a 
negative relationship between self-reported financing onstraints and actual firm growth, a relationship tronger 
for small firms and in countries with less developed financial systems; Djankov et al. (2003) show that a higher 
degree of judicial formalism is associated with lower perceptions of enterprises of courts’ fairness, honesty and 
consistency; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) and Barth et al. (2009) show that a more market-based 
supervisory approach and more efficient systems of credit information sharing are associated with lower 
financing constraints.  
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remaining 23 countries have one survey each.  Note, h wever, that these are not panel data, 
as not the same firms are being surveyed in subsequent s rveys in the same country.  As our 
variables of interest – branch penetration and credit information sharing – are either available 
only at one point of time or show little if any time variation, our variation comes from the 
cross-section rather than time-series.  In order to control for confounding factors, we control 
with year dummies for the year of the survey.  We also confirm all our findings with 
regressions that only use data from the latest enterpris  survey of each sample country.  
We construct the tax evasion variable using responses from the following question:  
“Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and 
regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”  Using responses on this question, we 
construct two variables: the tax evasion ratio is one minus the share of sales reported for tax 
purposes, while the tax evasion dummy is one if a company reports that any sale goes 
unreported. The tax evasion ratio ranges from an average of 42% in China to less than 3% in 
Chile, with an average across countries of 16%. While in Brazil 83% of firms report tax 
evasion in their industry, in Chile it is only 14 % and the average across countries is 45%.   
Table 1 reports the average values for these two indicators across the countries in our sample. 
However, there is not only a large cross-country, but also a large within-country variation in 
tax evasion. Specifically, the between country standard deviation of the tax evasion ratio is 
0.116, while the within-country standard deviation s 0.237, thus almost twice as large.10   
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The question on tax evasion is worded in this indirect way to elicit more honest 
answers. On the other hand, this wording might provide some measurement error as 
responses might truly reflect perceived industry aver ges rather than own behavior.  There 
are several reasons to believe that this will not bias our results. First, tax evasion ratios are 
                                                
10 The within-country standard deviation is calculated using the deviations from country averages, whereas the 
between-country standard deviation is calculated from the country averages. 
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relatively stable over time within a country.  The correlation between tax evasion ratios from 
the Enterprise Surveys and from the World Business Environment in 1999/200 is 64%. 
Second, there is a high correlation between the ratio of informal activity to GDP and tax 
evasion. Specifically, using data from Schneider and Ernste (2000) we find a correlation 
coefficient of 65%, significant at the 1% level. We also find a high correlation (>60%) 
between our tax evasion measure and the tax evasion index developed by the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook.11 Finally, if firms evading taxes to the same degree spond 
differently to the question in different institutional environments, this would bias our results 
against finding any significant relationship. A somewhat different measurement concern is 
that we measure tax evasion only for existing formal enterprises, thereby not capturing 
informal enterprises; however, this will rather underestimate the variation in tax evasion 
across countries (Johnson et al., 2000).   
We relate our measures of tax evasion to an array of financial sector indicators. We 
start with a standard indicator of financial depth, Private Credit to GDP, which measures 
total outstanding claims of financial institutions on the domestic nonfinancial private sector, 
relative to GDP (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2010).  Previous research has shown a 
positive and significant relationship between financi l sector depth and economic growth 
(Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000).  While Private Credit to GDP has been traditionally used 
as indicator of financial development, it does not properly measure the breadth of the 
financial system, i.e. the extent to which financial nstitutions cater to smaller and 
geographically more remote customers. We therefore use a recently compiled data set on 
banking sector outreach (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007). Specifically, we 
use geographic branch penetration, which is the number of bank branches per square 
kilometer and demographic branch penetration, which is the number of bank branches per 
capita, both measured for 2003/4.12   While both indicators of branch penetration are 
positively correlated with Private Credit to GDP, this correlation is far from perfect.  For 
                                                
11 This indicator is based on expert assessment of how widespread tax evasion is in a country, ranging from zero 
– common – to ten – not common.  
12 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) also present data on the number of loan account and the 
average loan balance to income per capita, but these data are available for a much smaller set of countries.  
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example, both Estonia and El Salvador have Private Credit to GDP ratios around 40%, but 
demographic branch penetration is 15.2 per 100,000 people in Estonia, while it is 4.6 in El 
Salvador. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) show that higher branch 
penetration is associated with a higher share of households and firms that use formal financial 
services and with lower self-reported financing constraints of firms.  
In addition to indicators of banking sector outreach, we use several indicators of the 
information framework supporting the banking sector, as previous research has shown the 
relevance of credit information sharing especially for smaller firms (Brown, Jappelli, and 
Pagano, 2009).  We include a dummy variable – Credit Information Sharing  - indicating 
whether a country has a functioning credit registry. We also use a more detailed indicator of 
the Depth of Credit Information Sharing , which ranges from zero to six and indicates how 
much information on what share of the borrower population is collected and distributed, as 
well as whether both financial and non-financial institutions are tapped for information. 
Specifically, a value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have 
each of these characteristics: (1) both positive and negative credit information are distributed; 
(2) data on both firms and individual borrowers aredistributed; (3) data from retailers, trade 
creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than two 
years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% 
of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data.   
We also include dummy indicators for the existence of a Public or Private Credit Registry 
as well as indicators of the Private or Public Credit Registry Coverage, measured as the 
number of firms and individuals listed in registries relative to the adult population. While 
private credit registries have the advantage that tey often include data from non-regulated 
financial and non-financial corporations, public registries might be more complete as 
reporting is compulsory. Since the earliest data avil ble for Depth of Credit Information 
Sharing and Credit Registry Coverage are from 2003 in the World Bank Doing Business 
Databank, we use the average values of 2003 and 2005 for these variables. For Public of 
Private Credit Registry dummies, the historical data re available from Djankov et al. (2007) 
13 
 
so that we use value for the same year as the respective firm-level survey. We control for an 
array of firm characteristics that might be correlat d with the decision to underreport sales 
and which are defined in more detail in Appendix Table 1.  Specifically, we include the size 
of the enterprise, as measured by the log of number of mployees, the log of firm age, the 
location – capital city or small city/town, with medium-sized city the omitted category -, a 
dummy variable if the firm is an exporter and the share of state ownership. Finally, we 
control for the education of the manager of the firm, varying from less than secondary 
education to postgraduate degree.  From theory and previous research, we expect size, age, 
exporter and state ownership to be negatively associated with tax evasion, while we expect 
firms that are located in smaller towns to be more lik ly to evade taxes.13 The association 
with manager education, on the other hand, is a-priori ambiguous.  23% of the firms in our 
sample are small firms (fewer than 20 employees), while 45% are large firms (more than 100 
firms), with an average of 30 employees. On average, firms are 14 years old and the average 
share of government ownership is 7%. 21% of firms are exporting; 40% of firms are in small 
cities and towns, while 31% are in the capital city. Finally, on average, managers have at least 
secondary education.  
We also include an array of country control variables. In addition to controlling for 
financial depth, we include an indicator of Bank Concentration, which is the share of the 
largest three banks’ assets in total assets of the banking system.  Controlling for Private 
Credit to GDP and Bank Concentration will increase our confidence that the proxies of 
banking sector outreach and credit information sharing do not capture other dimensions of 
financial development. In addition, we control for GDP per capita, to thus discriminate 
between economic and financial development. Our sample varies between Madagascar with 
162 U.S. dollars GDP per capita and Germany with a GDP per capita of more than 30,000 
dollars. As with all time-varying country-level vari bles, we use the value for the same year 
as the respective firm-level survey. 
We also include several proxies for alternative explanations of tax evasion, using both 
                                                
13 Ideally, we would like to have an indicator of actual distance from the economic center of the country, but are 
restricted to using this location indicator as proxy variable.  
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firm-level and country-level indicators.  First, we include the Tax Rate, which is measured as 
the tax rate a typical commercial enterprise pays on pr fits (Djankov et al., 2009). Our data 
vary between 20% and 87%. We also include the firm-level survey response to the question 
whether taxation is an obstacle for the operation and growth of the enterprise, with the 
responses varying between zero (no obstacle) and four (very severe obstacle). Second, we 
include an array of institutional indicators to contr l for the hypothesis that weak legal and 
political institutions causing corruption and deficient public services explain why firms prefer 
to go underground.  In our baseline regressions, we include a country-level indicator of 
Control of Corruption  from the Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) Governance 
Matters database as well as a firm-level survey respon e to the question whether corruption 
is an obstacle to the operation and growth of the enterprise. We also include the Kaufman, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) indicator on Government Effectiveness and the firm-level 
survey response to whether Crime is an obstacle to the operation and growth of the 
enterprise. In robustness tests, we will include additional indicators of countries’ institutional 
framework; we will discuss them below. 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables, while Panel B 
shows the correlations between the different variables.  We find that firms located in smaller 
towns, smaller firms and younger firms evade a higher share of taxes, while state-owned 
firms, exporting firms and firms with better educated managers evade taxes to a lesser degree. 
Firms that report taxation, corruption and crime as higher obstacle and have less confidence 
in the judiciary also evade more taxes. However, there are also many significant correlations 
between firm characteristics. Smaller firms are more likely to be located in smaller towns and 
are less likely to be exporter, are younger and are less likely to have managers with a higher 
education degree. The different indicators of growth obstacles and confidence in the judiciary 
are also significantly correlated with each other.  The country-level correlations show that tax 
evasion by firms is more prominent in countries with lower branch penetration and less 
efficient credit information sharing.  However, tax evasion is also significantly associated 
with corruption, taxation, government effectiveness and economic and financial development, 
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underlining the need for multivariate analysis.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
2.2. Methodology 
To assess the relationship between tax evasion and b king sector outreach, we run 
the following regression: 
Tijk = αFi + βCi + γBj + ιk + εijk       (1) 
where T is the tax evasion ratio or dummy as reportd by firm j in country i and industry k, F 
is a vector of financial sector indicators, including indicators of credit information sharing 
and banking outreach,  C is an array of country-level control variables, B is a vector of firm-
level control variables, as discussed above. ι is a vector of 26 industry dummies and ε the 
white-noise error term. We also include year dummies for the year the survey was conducted 
to thus control for any global trends and for differences within countries with several surveys. 
We use a tobit model for the regression of the tax evasion ratio, as the variable is bounded 
between zero and one, and a probit model for the regressions of the tax evasion dummy.  We 
report marginal effects rather than coefficient estima es to gauge the statistical as well as 
economic significance of our regression results. Further, we report clustered standard errors, 
i.e. allow for correlation between error terms within countries, but not across countries.  A 
negative and significant α would indicate that deeper financial systems, higher banking 
outreach and a more effective and inclusive information framework are associated with a 
lower incidence of informality and tax evasion ratio.  
 The variation across firms of different sizes, location and sectors allows us to test for 
a differential impact of financial sector development on tax evasion. Specifically, the 
hypotheses formulated above would predict the impact of financial sector development to be 
stronger for smaller firms and for firms in more remote location.  We will test for such 
differential impact by utilizing the following regression models: 




Tijk = αFi + βCi + γBj + δFi*Locationj  + ιk + εijk     (3) 
where size is a vector of dummies for small and large firms (with medium-sized firms being 
the benchmark category) and Location a vector of dummies for firms in the capital city and 
small city (with firms in medium-sized cities being the benchmark category).14  Theory 
would suggest a negative coefficient on the interaction of financial sector depth and outreach 
with Small firm and Small city, while we expect positive coefficients on the interaction of 
financial sector depth and outreach with Large firm and Capital city. We also use an indicator 
variable Firm Location, which ranges from 1 (capital city) to 5 (small town) as alternative to 
the firm location dummies and expect a negative sign on its interaction with the financial 
sector indicators.15 
Beyond size and location influencing firms’ increasing benefits from formality in 
countries with more effective credit information sharing and better banking sector outreach, 
there might also be industry-variation in such benefits.  A large literature has exploited 
industry variation in characteristics such as dependence on external financing, liquidity needs 
and growth opportunities as identification condition to assess the impact of financial and 
institutional development on firm growth.  Such an identification strategy relies on the 
assumption that such industry features are constant across countries and uses actual data on 
external financing, liquidity holdings and growth from industries in the U.S. as benchmark 
under the assumption that they reflect demand rather conditions.16 We will focus on three 
industry characteristics constructed with these assumptions.  First, dependence on external 
finance is the fraction of capital expenditures notfinanced with internal funds (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998).  Similarly, liquidity needs is constructed as the ratio of inventories over sales 
                                                
14 Small firms are defined as firms with less than 20 employees, while large firms are defined as firms with more 
than 100 employees.  A small city is defined as having less than 250,000 inhabitants.  
15 Using the location indicator assumes that the variation in the relationship between tax evasion and fi ancial 
sector outreach is linear across the five location categories, a rather heroic assumption.  Given that we get 
qualitatively similar results using location dummies or the indicator variable, however, we do not think that this 
biases our results.  
16 As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Raddatz (2006), the U.S. is not included in our sample.  The calculation of 
industry values is based on data from large firms for which market frictions should be significantly smaller than 
for small and medium-sized firms and should reflect mostly demand.  
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(Raddatz, 2006). Finally, growth opportunities is measured by the market-book ratio, 
measured as the median ratio of the sum of market value of equity plus the book value of debt 
divided by total assets for listed U.S. enterprises in the same industry over the period 2000-
2005, following Graham et al. (2008). A higher market-book ratio would indicate higher 
growth opportunities and thus higher loan demand. We have data for 26 industries.  
To test for a differential impact of banking sector outreach on firms in different 
industries, we utilize the following specification.  
Tijk = αFi + βCi + γBj + δFi*Industryk  + ιk + εijk     (4) 
where Industry is an industry characteristics; either dependence o  xternal finance, liquidity 
needs or growth opportunities.17 Since we control for industry dummies and include th
levels of the respective financial sector indicators, the δ coefficients will capture the 
differential effect of credit information sharing and banking sector outreach on firms in 
industries with different financing and liquidity needs and growth opportunities.   
 While we report Tobit regressions to assess the diff rential impact of size, location 
and industry characteristics on the relationship betwe n branch penetration, credit 
information sharing and tax evasion, we confirm all our findings with OLS regressions given 
the difficulty of interpreting the marginal effects of interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai 
and Norton, 2003). 
 In a final set of regressions, we use a smaller panel sample of firms and countries to 
test the relationship between credit information sharing and tax evasion over time: 
Tijkt = αFi,t + βCi,t + γBj,t +δX j + εijk       (5) 
where  Xj  are firm fixed effects and t is either 2002 or 2005.  Here, we only include the 
constraint and firm size variables among the vector B of firm-level characteristics, as other 
firm characteristics are time-invariant.  We also use interaction regressions as in (2) – (4), 
interacting credit information sharing with size, location and industry characteristics.  Unlike 
the remainder of the regressions, we use OLS to estimate specification (5), given that Tobit 
                                                
17 Since these three industry characteristics are significantly correlated with each other, we do not include them 
at the same time.  
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panel data model with fixed effects yields biased estimates (see Greene, 2004).18 
 
3. Results 
Combining firm-level, industry-level and country-level variation, this section tests 
whether better credit information sharing and higher banking sector outreach are associated 
with lower tax evasion.  We first explore cross-country variation in credit information sharing 
and banking sector outreach, before combining it with firm-level and industry-level variation.  
Finally, we use firm-level fixed effects regression for a sub-sample to control even more 
rigorously for simultaneity and endogeneity biases. 
 
3.1. Basic results 
The results in Table 3 show a statistically and economically significant relationship 
between banking sector outreach and the incidence of inf rmality across countries.  We 
report both probit (Panel A) and tobit regressions (Panel B) that include unreported industry 
and year dummies and are clustered on the country level. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
As can be seen from the table, the existence and depth of credit registries is associated 
with a lower incidence of tax evasion. Both the credit registry dummy and the indicator of the 
depth of the information framework enter negatively and significantly in both probit and tobit 
regressions. The effect is also economically significant. Firms in countries with a credit 
registry are 20% less likely to evade taxes and the tax evasion ratio is 11% lower in these 
countries. A one standard deviation increase in depth of information sharing is associated 
with a 13% drop in the likelihood of corporate tax evasion and a 9.2% drop in the tax evasion 
ratio.  It is important to note that this effect is in addition to the positive effect that credit 
information sharing has on financial depth, which we proxy with Private Credit to GDP in the 
                                                
18 However, cross-sectional Tobit models do not have this kind of problem (see Wooldridge, 2002, p.538). 
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regression (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002).  
Greater banking sector outreach is also significantly associated with a lower incidence 
of informality. Both geographic and demographic branch penetration enter significantly and 
negatively in probit and tobit regressions. As in the case of credit information sharing, the 
effect is also economically significant, with a one standard deviation increase in demographic 
bank branch penetration being associated with a reduction in the incidence of tax evasion of 
13.9% and a reduction of the tax evasion ratio of 10.3%.19 Similarly, a one standard deviation 
increase in geographic bank branch penetration is associated with a reduction in the incidence 
of tax evasion of 14.9% and a reduction of the tax evasion ratio of 12.3%. 
Turning to the control variables, we find that higher financial sector depth, as proxied 
by Private Credit to GDP, is associated with a lower incidence and extent of informality, 
while higher bank concentration is associated with higher informality, although the latter 
result is not significant at the 5% level in all reg ssions.  We also find a negative relationship 
between the level of economic development and informality, although GDP per capita does 
not enter significantly in all regressions.   
Several of the firm-level variables enter significantly in the regressions. We find that 
smaller firms (as measured by the log of employment) report consistently a higher incidence 
and extent of informality, while exporters are less likely to evade taxes. Firms in small towns 
are more likely to evade taxes, while firms in the capital city are less likely to do so.  Some of 
these relationships, however, are not consistent across the different models. There is some, 
not surprising, evidence that state-owned enterprises are less likely to evade taxes, as are 
older firms.  
Concerning alternative explanations of informality, we find that higher taxation, 
measured both on the firm level as on the economy-wide level, is associated with a higher 
incidence and extent of informality. Institutional variables including the control of corruption 
and government quality, on the other hand, enter negatively, but not always significantly in 
the regressions.  Similarly, crime as a growth constraint (as self-reported by firms) enters 
                                                
19 Please note that these marginal effects and elasticities are computed at the mean of all variables and there 
might be variation across the distribution.  
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positively, but not consistently significant. On the other hand, we find strong evidence for the 
contractual hypothesis as firms that have more trust in the judicial systems, report a lower 
degree of tax evasion.    
In unreported robustness tests (available on request), we instrument for both credit 
information sharing and banking sector outreach with exogenous country traits, including 
legal origin, latitude and ethnic fractionalization a d confirm our findings.20  The empirical 
results are highly robust. In fact, the IV coefficients are somewhat larger than the OLS 
coefficients, indicating the existence of potential measurement error, which would tend to 
“attenuate” the coefficient estimate toward zero. Hwever, it might also be possible that the 
larger IV estimate is driven by the omission of other institutional variables correlated with tax 
evasion and with our instrumental variables, as noted by Pande and Udry (2006).   
Table 4 shows the robustness of our findings to utilizing alternative measures of the 
information sharing framework and to controlling for an array of additional institutional 
indicators. While we present only the Tobit regression  of the tax evasion ratio, we obtain the 
same or similar results when using the Probit specification with the tax evasion dummy, 
available on request.   Specifically, the results in columns (1) and (2) show that both private 
and public credit registries are associated with lower tax evasion ratios, with the economic 
size of the effects being similar. While in column (1), we use simple dummy variables 
indicating the existence of a public or private credit registry, column (2) uses indicators of the 
coverage of public and private credit registries, as measured by the proportion of the adult 
population covered by the respective credit registrie . All four indicators enter negatively and 
significantly.  While demographic branch penetration continues to enter negatively and 
significantly when controlling for the dummy variables, it loses significance when 
introducing the credit registry coverage variables, suggesting that “inclusion” in the 
information framework might better capture access to and inclusion into the formal banking 
system than banking sector outreach.  Private Credit to GDP does not enter significantly in 
either of the two regressions.  
                                                
20 We base the selection of instrumental variables on the theoretical and empirical work in the law, institution 
and finance literature (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson , 2001, Beck et al., 2003).  
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The column (3) – (10) results of Table 4 show that our findings are robust to 
controlling for most, but not all dimensions of a country’s institutional framework. We first 
control for additional institutional indicators from the Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) 
Governance Matters database.21  Rule of Law enter negatively and significantly at least on 
the 5% level, while Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, and Regulatory Quality do 
not enter significantly. Depth of Information Sharing loses its significance when controlling 
for Voice and Accountability, while Demographic Branch Penetration continues to enter 
negatively and significantly in all regressions.  Next, we control for specific policy elements 
of the institutional framework.  Specifically, we control for Creditor Rights (the rights of 
secured creditors vis-à-vis a company in bankruptcy), Contract Enforcement (the number of 
legal steps to enforce a bounced check), Entry Barriers (number of registration steps for a 
new formal enterprise), and Labor Market Rigidity.  All four indicators are from the IFC’s 
Doing Business database and previous research has shown a significant association of these 
dimensions of the business environment with the incidence of informality and firm entry 
(Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006). Creditor Rights 
enters significantly, while Contract Enforcement, Entry Barriers and Labor Market Rigidity 
do not enter significantly. Controlling for Contract Enforcement reduces the significance of 
Demographic Branch Penetration below 10%, while controlling for Entry Barriers reduces 
the significance of Depth of Information Sharing below 10%.  
In summary, our findings of a negative relationship between credit information 
sharing and banking sector outreach, on the one hand, and tax evasion, of the other hand, are 
robust to controlling for other elements of the institutional and business environment 
associated with the incidence of informality.  In some cases, it is hard to distinguish between 
specific dimensions, due to the high correlation betwe n different dimensions of the policy 
toolkit.   
[Table 4 here] 
 
                                                




We conduct some further robustness, which are available on request. First, we test 
whether our results are driven by one specific country and replicate the Table 3 results 
omitting each country one-at-a-time; the results hold. Since the relationship between credit 
information sharing, banking sector outreach and tax evasion might vary with the income 
level, we also drop all six high-income countries and confirm our findings.  Second, we are 
concerned that the obstacle variables are endogenous to the incidence and extent of tax 
evasion and might therefore bias our results. We therefore re-run our regressions, excluding 
all obstacle variables; all results are confirmed, not only in statistical significance but also in 
coefficient size. Third, we limit our sample to the latest survey for each country.  While our 
sample is reduced to 18,500 firms, all our findings are confirmed. Finally, we are concerned 
that the firm-level responses on tax evasion might be subject to measurement error, reflecting 
either their own tax evasion or the average for the industry.  We therefore re-run our 
regressions on the industry-level, averaging firm-leve  responses and firm-level values for 
each industry-country cell.  All our findings are confirmed.  
Up to now we have related firm-level responses to country-level variation in credit 
information sharing and banking sector outreach. However, different firms might react 
differently to the incentives and opportunities provided by better credit information sharing 
and banking sector outreach.  We will explore this po sibility in the following; testing for 
such differential impact also allows us to more rigo ously address the issue of omitted 
variables and causality.   
 
3.2. Exploiting firm heterogeneity 
The hypotheses formulated in the Introduction suggest a differential relationship of 
information sharing and banking sector outreach wit firms’ decision to evade taxation across 
firms of different sizes and in different locations.  Specifically, smaller firms and firms in 
more remote areas are conjectured to respond more str ngly to incentives and opportunities 
provided by more effective information sharing and banking sector outreach.  We test this 




[Table 5 here] 
 
The results in Table 5 confirm this conjecture and show a significant variation of the 
relationship between information sharing and banking sector outreach, on the one hand, and 
firms’ decision to evade taxes, on the other hand, cross different locations within a country. 
Here we add interaction terms of Depth of Information Sharing, Demographic Branch 
Penetration and Geographic Branch Penetration with dummy variables that indicate whether 
a firm is located in the capital city or a small town, with the omitted category being firms in 
mid-sized towns.  While we find a more muted relationship between information sharing, 
banking sector outreach and tax evasion for firms in the capital city, the relationship is even 
stronger for firms in small towns.  The differences in the relationship across firms of different 
locations are also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the Depth of 
information decreases the tax evasion by 6.4% for firms in capital city, but decreases the tax 
evasion by about 16.8% for firms in small towns (Column 1).  Similarly, a one standard 
deviation increase in the demographic branch penetration decreases the tax evasion by 3.7% 
for firms in capital city, but decreases the tax evasion by about 10.6% for firms in small 
towns (Column 2). Using geographic branch penetration y elds statistically and economically 
similar results (column 3). Finally, we include interaction terms of both firm location with 
Depth of Information Sharing and Demographic Branch Penetration (column 4) and, in 
addition, control for the interaction of Private Credit to GDP with firm location (column 5).  
Here, rather than introducing separate interaction terms with Small town and Capital City, we 
use the Firm Location indicator ranging from capital city (1) to towns with fewer than 50,000 
inhabitants (5).  We find an increasing impact of this firm location indicator on the 
relationship between both information sharing depth and banking sector outreach, on the one 
hand, and reductions in tax evasion, on the other hand, as we move from firms in capital 
cities to large cities and small towns.  This finding is robust to controlling for the interaction 
of Private Credit to GDP and firm location, which also enters negatively and significantly at 
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the 10% level (column 5). Compared to the location interaction terms with credit information 
depth and banking sector outreach, however, the interaction of firm location with financial 
depth is small in size, suggesting only a small differential impact of financial depth on firms 
in different locations.  
The results in Table 6 show that the relationship between information sharing, 
banking sector outreach and tax evasion varies significa tly across firms of different sizes.  A 
one standard deviation increase in the Depth of Infrmation Sharing decreases the tax evasion 
by 7.7% for large, but by about 15.2% for small firms (Column 1).  Similarly, a one standard 
deviation increase in the demographic branch penetration decreases the tax evasion by 2.8% 
for large firms, but decreases the tax evasion by about 11.3% for small firms (Column 2). The 
interaction of Demographic Branch Penetration and the small firm dummy is not significant, 
however, suggesting that there is no significant additional effect of banking sector outreach as 
we move from mid-sized to small firms. When using Geographic Branch Penetration, we find 
that the marginal effect of banking sector outreach on large firms’ incentives to evade taxes is 
not significantly different from those of medium-sized firms, while smaller firms face 
significantly higher incentives. The column (4) result  show that the effect of information 
sharing and of banking sector outreach on tax evasion varies with firm size, but not with firm 
location, once we control for the interaction with firm size. While the interaction of Small 
firm with depth of information sharing and demographic branch penetration continue to enter 
negatively and significantly, the interactions of the financial sector variables with firm 
location enter negatively but insignificantly. The column 5 regressions finally show that 
Private Credit to GDP interacts significantly (but wi h a small economic effect) with firm size 
in its effect on tax evasion, while it does not interact significantly with firm location.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Summarizing it seems that it is rather size than locati n of the firm, which allows us 
to observe a differential effect of banking sector outreach and credit information sharing on 
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tax evasion.22  This suggests that the channel through which financial sector outreach helps 
reduce informality is by expanding access to financi l services for smaller firms rather than 
through geographic expansion of outreach.  
 
3.3 Exploiting industry heterogeneity 
The results in Table 7 show that that banking sector outreach and credit information 
sharing have a differential impact on tax evasion across firms in different industries.  As 
discussed above, here we interact an industry charateristic (external dependence, liquidity 
needs or growth opportunities) with our financial sector indicators. The regressions in 
columns 1 and 2 suggest that the effect of demographic and geographic banking sector 
outreach and of credit information on reducing tax evasion sharing increases in firms’ 
dependence on external finance.  This effect is in addition to the negative and significant 
interaction of financial depth with external dependce. The economic size of this effect is 
moderate, compared to the economic size of the firm s ze effect discussed above: an increase 
of one standard deviation in external dependence inreases the marginal effect of credit 
information sharing by 1.7% and the marginal effect of demographic branch penetration by 
1.2%.  Similarly, the column 3 and 4 regressions show that the effect of geographic banking 
sector outreach and of credit information on reducing tax evasion sharing increases in firms’ 
liquidity needs, while the interaction with demographic branch penetration does not enter 
significantly. The economic size of this effect, however, is even smaller than in the case of 
external dependence: an increase of one standard deviation in liquidity needs increases the 
marginal effect of credit information sharing by 0.4% and the marginal effect of geographic 
branch penetration by 0.2%.   The columns 5 and 6 regressions, finally, suggest a differential 
impact of banking sector outreach and credit information sharing and demographic branch 
penetration on firms in industries with different growth opportunities, with the economic 
effect being 1.2% and 1.5%, respectively. This suggests that financial sector outreach 
                                                
22 In unreported robustness tests, we also tested for the significance of triple interaction terms, thus as essing 
whether the effect of banking sector outreach and cre it information sharing varies for firms of a specific size 
class across different location and for firms in a specific location across different sizes.  None of the triple 
interaction terms, however, entered significantly.  
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increases incentives for firms that are more dependent on external finance and have higher 
liquidity needs and growth opportunities to enter the formal economy.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The Table 8 regressions, finally, confirm that there is a differential effect of banking 
sector outreach and credit information sharing on tax evasion across firms of different size 
and firms in industries with different financing, liquidity needs and growth opportunities, 
while there is no differential effect on firms in different locations. Here we include 
interaction terms of (i) depth of information sharing, (ii) demographic or geographic branch 
penetration and (iii) Private Credit to GDP with (i) small and large firm dummies, (ii) the 
firm location indicator and (iii) an industry characteristic. While the significance levels of 
some of the interaction terms decrease, overall we confirm our previous findings that banking 
sector outreach and credit information sharing explain a larger variation in tax evasion among 
small firms and firms in industries with higher fina cing, liquidity needs and growth 
opportunities than among larger firms and firms in industries with lower financing and 
liquidity needs and growth opportunities.  With thecaveat that these are cross-sectional data, 
this suggests that smaller firms and firms with higher financing and liquidity needs as well as 
higher growth opportunities react more strongly to greater banking sector outreach and to 
more effective and inclusive credit registries by reducing the incidence and amount of tax 
evasion.  On the other hand, we do not find significant interaction terms of the credit 
information sharing and branch penetration variables with the indicator of firm location. In 
addition, the interaction terms with the industry indicators enter with reduced significance 
and with even smaller economic effects than in the Table 7 regressions, where we do not 
control for the interaction with firm size.  Overall, this suggests that it is foremost the 
variation in firm size that is significant in its interaction with credit information sharing and 
branch penetration in explaining cross-firm and cross-country variation in tax evasion, with 
some variation being explained by industry variation n the need for external finance and 
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liquidity needs and no variation explained by the different locations of firms.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
The Table 9 regressions show that our findings are robust to using country-fixed 
effects rather than country-level variables. Here, we drop all country-level variables, 
including our financial sector indicators and replace them with country dummies. This allows 
us to control even more rigorously for confounding country factors.  All our findings are 
confirmed; while the interaction terms of firm size with branch penetration and credit 
information sharing enter significantly, the interaction terms of firm location do not. 
Similarly, the interaction terms of external dependce, liquidity needs and growth 
opportunities enter significantly and negatively.  However, not only the significance levels, 
but also the economic size of the coefficients is very similar to the previous results.  
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
3.4 Exploiting time-series variation 
  In this final section, we exploit time-series variation in credit information sharing 
across a sample of 26 transition economies as final robustness tests.  While we do not have 
sufficient time-series variation in branch penetration as of yet, we have data for a panel of 
897 firms across 26 Central and Eastern European cou tries for 2002 and 2005 as well as 
variation in credit information sharing over the same time period (Brown, Jappelli and 
Pagano, 2009).23 Since the same firms were interviewed twice, we can include firm-fixed 
effects and therefore drop firm characteristics except for the log of employees, but include the 
obstacle variables.24 Since panel Tobit estimates with fixed effects tend to be biased (Greene, 
2004), we use OLS regressions for our panel regressions. Between 2002 and 2005, eight of 
                                                
23 The sample in these regressions is only partly overlapping with the previous cross-sectional samples, as we 
also include countries, for which we do not have branch penetration data in our cross-sectional estimations.  
24 While some of these firms were surveyed again in 2008, the tax evasion question was unfortunately not 
included in this latest round.  
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the 26 countries introduced or upgraded their credit information system, with four countries 
introducing credit registries and another four improving the collection and distribution of 
information.   
The results in Table 10 show a negative relationship between credit information 
sharing and tax evasion. The result in column 1 show  a negative and significant coefficient 
on Depth of Information Sharing.  The estimates in column 2 show that this relationship is 
stronger for smaller firms, while the effect does not vary across firms in different locations 
(column 3).  The effect also varies significantly with industry characteristics, with firms in 
industries with higher liquidity needs and better growth opportunities reducing tax evasion 
more in response to improvements in credit information sharing (columns 5 and 6), while the 
interaction of external dependence with Depth of Information Sharing is insignificant 
(column 4). Including size, location and industry interaction terms at the same time confirms 
the previous findings (columns 7 – 9). We note thatas in the above regressions, this level and 
differential effect of credit information sharing comes on top of the effect of higher credit to 
the private sector following the improvements in credit information sharing. In unreported 
regressions we confirm these findings for our tax evasion dummy variable. Overall, the fixed-
firm effect regressions provide powerful evidence that our cross-country estimations are not 
driven by simultaneity or endogeneity bias.  Firms in countries that improve their systems of 
credit information sharing report lower tax evasion after such an improvement and it is 
especially the smaller firms and firms with higher liquidity needs and growth opportunities 
that report lower tax evasion.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
4. Conclusions 
 This paper explores the association of credit information sharing and banking sector 
outreach with the incidence and extent of informality across countries and across firm. We 
find strong evidence that firms in countries with deeper and more effective systems of tax 
evasion and higher branch penetration are less likely to evade taxes and hide a smaller share 
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of their sales. This effect decreases in firm size, i.e. smaller firms are especially sensitive to 
credit information sharing and branch penetration. While we also find variation in the 
relationship between financial sector outreach and tax evasion across firms in different 
locations, this interaction turns insignificant once we control for the interaction with firm 
size.  Similarly, while we also find variation in the relationship between financial sector 
outreach and tax evasion across industries with different financing and liquidity needs and 
growth opportunities, this relationship turns economically and statistically weaker once we 
control for the interaction with firm size. This underlines the importance of firm size when 
assessing the impact of institutional reforms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maskimovic, 2005).  
The results are robust to controlling for other institutional factors that can explain cross-
country variation in tax evasion and informality, thus underlining the importance that 
financial sector policies have in addressing wide-spread informality in many developing 
countries. Critically, our findings are robust to controlling for a standard measure of financial 
depth, suggesting that specific outreach dimensions have a first-order effect on real sector 
outcomes. Finally, our findings on credit information sharing are confirmed in a smaller 
panel sample of Central and East European countries where we show that the same firms 
report lower tax evasion after the introduction or improvements in credit information sharing.  
Our findings are consistent with theories that posit increased opportunity costs of tax evasion 
in financial systems that provide easier access to credit.  They also show that financial sector 
outreach is an important policy lever to bring more small firms into the formal economy.  
 We see this paper as a first exploration of the relationship between financial sector 
outreach and tax evasion. As more data become available, time variation in banking sector 
outreach as well as the introduction or upgrading of credit information sharing can be linked 
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Table 1. Tax evasion across sample countries  
 Country Tax evasion ratio (mean) Tax evasion dummy ( ean) 
1 Albania 0.228 0.673 
2 Armenia 0.060 0.278 
3 Azerbaijan 0.137 0.363 
4 Belarus 0.076 0.254 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.209 0.412 
6 Brazil 0.327 0.828 
7 Bulgaria 0.136 0.399 
8 Chile 0.029 0.142 
9 China 0.424 0.494 
10 Costa Rica 0.283 0.683 
11 Croatia 0.096 0.383 
12 Czech Republic 0.118 0.476 
13 Ecuador 0.203 0.489 
14 El Salvador 0.241 0.521 
15 Estonia 0.050 0.330 
16 Georgia 0.235 0.548 
17 Germany 0.057 0.447 
18 Greece 0.110 0.532 
19 Guatemala 0.230 0.645 
20 Guyana 0.271 0.744 
21 Honduras 0.316 0.654 
22 Hungary 0.114 0.409 
23 Ireland 0.038 0.288 
24 Kazakhstan 0.096 0.290 
25 Kenya 0.134 0.459 
26 Korea, Rep. 0.100 0.437 
27 Kyrgyz Republic 0.200 0.492 
28 Lithuania 0.126 0.414 
29 Madagascar 0.065 0.210 
30 Nicaragua 0.336 0.650 
31 Philippines 0.220 0.579 
32 Poland 0.098 0.415 
33 Portugal 0.082 0.373 
34 Romania 0.085 0.316 
35 Russian Federation 0.167 0.433 
36 Slovak Republic 0.081 0.352 
37 Slovenia 0.118 0.449 
38 South Africa 0.091 0.158 
39 Spain 0.037 0.183 
40 Sri Lanka 0.077 0.420 
41 Tanzania 0.305 0.730 
42 Turkey 0.363 0.683 
43 Zambia 0.158 0.535 
Note: The tax evasion ratio is computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of 
activity reports for tax purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number. The tax evasion dummy equals one if tax 
evasion ratio is greater than zero, otherwise zero. 
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Table 2A. Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of countries Observations 
Firm level variables           
Tax evasion dummy 0.46 0.49 0 1 43 22,627 
Tax evasion ratio 0.18 0.26 0 1 43 22,627 
Small city dummy 0.42 0.50 0 1 43 22,627 
Capital city dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1 43 22,627 
Firm location 2.92 1.53 1 5 43 22,627 
Small firm dummy 0.24 0.41 0 1 43 22,627 
Large firm dummy 0.44 0.50 0 1 43 22,627 
Log employment 3.39 1.68 0 9.88 43 22,627 
SOEpc 0.06 0.23 0 1 43 22,627 
Exporter dummy 0.22 0.41 0 1 43 22,627 
Log firm age 2.62 0.77 0 5.57 43 22,627 
Manager’s education level 2.36 2.42 0 6 43 22,627 
Problem with tax rates 1.86 1.31 0 4 43 22,627 
Problem with corruption 1.42 1.41 0 4 43 22,627 
Judicial strength 3.70 1.47 1 6 43 22,627 
Crime 1.17 1.33 0 4 43 22,627 
Country level variables           
Information sharing dummy  0.69 0.45 0 1 43  
Depth of information sharing 2.87 2.08 0 6 43  
Private bureau dummy 0.41 0.49 0 1 43  
Public credit registry dummy 0.47 0.50 0 1 43  
Public credit registry coverage 0.05 0.12 0 0.61 43  
Private credit bureau coverage 0.15 0.26 0 0.96 43  
Private Credit / GDP 0.34 0.37 0 1.43 43  
Bank Concentration 0.72 0.17 0.37 1 43  
Creditors right 1.98 0.91 0 4 41  
No. of  legal procedures 36.41 5.29 22 50 43  
Log GDP per capita 7.77 1.20 5.45 10.31 43  
Total tax rate 0.50 0.15 0.22 0.87 43  
Control of Corruption -0.05 0.78 -1.01 1.92 43  
Government Effectiveness 0.07 0.76 -1.13 1.64 43  
Voice and Accountability 0.09 0.82 -1.58 1.62 43  
Political Stability -0.04 0.75 -1.27 1.15 43  
Quality of Regulation 0.08 0.76 -1.60 1.59 43  
Rule of Law -0.06 0.78 -1.14 1.73 43  
Demo branch 1.22 1.74 0.06 9.59 43  
Geo branch 1.39 2.36 0.01 11.69 43  
Industrial level data     No. of industries  
Liquidity needs 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.27 26  
External dependence 0.42 0.86 -1.00 1.99 26  
Market-to-book ratio 1.40 0.35 0.95 2.36 26  
Note: The tax evasion ratio is computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of 
activity reports for tax purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number. The tax evasion dummy equals to one if tax 
evasion ratio is greater than zero, otherwise zero. The small city dummy takes the value one if the firm is located in a city with fewer than 
250,000 inhabitants, while capital city takes on the value one if the firm is located in the capital. Firm location takes the following values: 
1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 million population; 3=City of 250,000-1million; 4=City of 50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with 
less than 50,000 population. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm has fewer than 20 employees, while Large firm dummy takes on 
value one if firm has more than 100 employees. Log employment is the log of total employees of the firm. SOEpc is the percentage of firm 
ownership in government hand. Exporter takes value one if the firm exports. Log firm age is the log of number of year since establishment of 
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firm.  Manager’s education level takes the following values: 1. Did not complete secondary school 2. Secondary School 3. Vocational Training 
4. Some university training 5. Graduate degree (BA, Sc etc.) 6. Post graduate degree (Ph D, Masters). Problem with tax rates, problems with 
corruption and Crime assess whether either are constrai t  on the growth of the company and take the following values: 0 = No obstacle 1 = 
Minor obstacle 2 = Moderate obstacle 3 = Major obstacle 4 = Very Severe Obstacle. Judicial strength is e answer to the following question: "I 
am confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes." To what degree do you agree with 
this statement? 1. Fully disagree, 2. Disagree in most cases, 3. Tend to disagree, 4. Tend to agree, 5. Agree in most cases, 6. Fully agree. 
Information sharing dummy equals one if an information sharing agency (public registry or private burea ) operates in the country, zero 
otherwise. Depth of information sharing measures th information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when 
a country’s information agencies have each of these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern 
of on-time repayments) and negative information (for example, late payments, number and amount of defaults nd bankruptcies) are distributed; 
(2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial 
institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of 
income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values 
indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Private and 
public credit registry take on value one if a private or public credit registry exists. Private/public credit registry coverage reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a private/public credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. 
The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult pop lation. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financial 
institutions divided by GDP. Bank concentration is as ets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all c mmercial banks over the period 2002 
to 2005. Creditor rights measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy. No. of legal procedures is the number of steps to enforce a 
contract in the court. Total tax rate is the typical company tax rate as share of profits. Control of Corruption, Political Stability, Rule of Law, 
Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability and Quality of Regulation are measured in 2005, withmean zero and standard deviation 
one, and are based on a large number of underlying institutional indicators. Demo branch is the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people 
in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004.  Liquidity needs is measured by inventories 
over sales, which is the median ratio of total inventories to annual sales for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.  External 
dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.The 
market-to- book ratio is equal to median ratio of (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/to al asset, for the US firms in the same 
industry during the period of 2002-2005.
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Firm location 0.076** 1         
Log employment -0.053** -0.133*** 1        
SOEpc -0.046** -0.005 0.258*** 1       
Exporter dummy -0.041*** -0.070** 0.368*** 0.002 1      
Log firm age -0.085*** -0.052*** 0.274*** 0.142** 0.140*** 1     
Manager’s education level 0.152** -0.185*** 0.284*** 0.061** 0.130*** 0.107** 1    
Problem with tax rates 0.140*** -0.043* 0.014 -0.091*** 0.016* 0.053*** 0.106** 1   
Problem with corruption 0.231** -0.097* 0.052* -0.076*** 0.020*** -0.042*** 0.191** 0.401*** 1  
Crime 0.180*** -0.072* 0.036* -0.063*** -0.004 -0.026** 0.186*** 0.333** 0.661*** 1 






















Demo branch -0.392*** 1         
Geo branch -0.361** 0.802*** 1        
Info share dummy -0.114** 0.236 0.277* 1       
Depth of info share -0.251*** 0.464*** 0.471*** 0.754*** 1      
Private Credit / GDP -0.443** 0.768** 0.718*** 0.326*** 0.514*** 1     
Bank Concentration 0.128* 0.151 0.082 0.061 0.074 0.075 1    
Total tax rate 0.056*** 0.056 0.018 0.102 -0.072 -0.200** -0.169 1   
Control of Corruption -0.392** 0.652*** 0.622*** 0.454** 0.682*** 0.781*** 0.160 -0.159 1  
Government Effectiveness -0.379*** 0.597** 0.563*** 0.355*** 0.577** 0.772*** 0.140* -0.249*** 0.946*** 1 







Table 3. Basic results: Information sharing, financial outreach, and tax evasion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Panel A: Probit regressions Panel B: Tobit regression  
Infoshare dummy -0.196    -0.110    
 [0.007]***    [0.007]***    
Depth of infoshare  -0.064 -0.063 -0.065  -0.046 -0.044 -0.045 
  [0.011]*** [0.024]** [0.026]**  [0.006]*** [0.008 ]*** [0.019]** 
Demo branch   -0.080    -0.059  
   [0.022]**    [0.005]***  
Geo branch    -0.063    -0.052 
    [0.030]**    [0.020]** 
Private 
Credit/GDP -0.237 -0.173 -0.148 -0.261 -0.181 -0.110 -0.104 -0.136 
 [0.011]** [0.054]* [0.114] [0.023]** [0.059]* [0.016]** [0.125] [0.050]* 
Bank 
concentration 0.336 0.298 0.277 0.271 0.238 0.186 0.163 0.146 
 [0.031]** [0.023]** [0.123] [0.075]* [0.020]** [0.038]** [0.135] [0.134] 
Smallcity 0.041 0.058 0.050 0.041 0.041 0.058 0.050 0.046 
 [0.127] [0.033]** [0.061]* [0.017]** [0.103] [0.016]** [0.055]* [0.021]** 
Capitalcity -0.033 -0.014 -0.027 -0.024 -0.058 -0.044 -0.051 -0.057 
 [0.027]** [0.126] [0.023]** [0.025]** [0.014]** [0.113] [0.022]** [0.020]** 
Log employ -0.094 -0.095 -0.110 -0.109 -0.041 -0.056 -0.047 -0.049 
 [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.008 ]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** 
SOEpc -0.304 -0.368 -0.367 -0.367 -0.127 -0.089 -0.091 -0.079 
 [0.121] [0.068]* [0.026]** [0.026]** [0.017]** [0.025]** [0.029]** [0.109] 
Exporter -0.107 -0.104 -0.137 -0.135 -0.049 -0.039 -0.052 -0.052 
 [0.027]** [0.113] [0.027]** [0.027]** [0.014]** [0.105] [0.022]** [0.029]** 
Log firmage -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.125] [0.131] [0.114] [0.018]** [0.106] [0.031]** [0.119] [0.128] 
Manager edu  -0.038 -0.029 -0.025  -0.036 -0.026 -0.021 
  [0.020]** [0.120] [0.118]  [0.014]** [0.117] [0.120] 
Problem_taxrate  0.076 0.080 0.078  0.026 0.030 0.027 
  [0.019]** [0.009]*** [0.003]***  [0.003]*** [0.00 6]*** [0.004]*** 
Problem_corrupt  0.134 0.135 0.136  0.056 0.052 0.053 
  [0.016]** [0.007]*** [0.002]***  [0.005]*** [0.00 8]*** [0.007]*** 
Crime  0.028 0.031 0.022  0.022 0.017 0.013 
  [0.033]** [0.171] [0.173]  [0.023]** [0.186] [0.211] 
Judicial strength  -0.032 -0.043 -0.045  -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
  [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.002]***  [0.007]*** [0.0 06]*** [0.003]*** 
Total_tax_rate 0.654 0.844 0.774 0.791 0.450 0.465 0.443 0.350 
 [0.014]** [0.015]** [0.012]** [0.018]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.015]** [0.014]** 
Control of 
Corruption -0.149 -0.175 -0.273 -0.166 -0.110 -0.170 -0.162 -0.147 
 [0.108] [0.032]** [0.018]** [0.119] [0.125] [0.107] [0.012]** [0.106] 
Government 
effectiveness -0.044 -0.056 -0.048 -0.063 -0.054 -0.071 -0.057 -0.075 
 [0.108] [0.033]** [0.109] [0.031]** [0.107] [0.033]** [0.120] [0.031]** 
Log GDP per 
capita -0.040 -0.026 -0.034 -0.037 -0.023 -0.021 -0.02  -0.029 
 [0.030]** [0.112] [0.118] [0.035]** [0.105] [0.024]** [0.118] [0.022]** 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
Countries 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.093 0.108 0.109 0.105 0.129 0.145 0.146 0.143 
Log_likelihood -15,849 -14,172 -14,159 -14,144 -15,237 -13,613 -13,586 -13,599 
Note: The tax evasion ratio is computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of 
activity reports for tax purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number. The tax evasion dummy equals to one if tax 
evasion ratio is greater than zero, otherwise zero. For the Tobit model, the dependent variable is tax evasion ratio. The small city dummy takes 
the value one if the firm is located in a city with fewer than 250,000 inhabitants, while capital citytakes on the value one if the firm is located in 
the capital. Small firm takes value one if the firm has fewer than 20 employees, whileLarge firm dummy takes on value one if firm has more 
than 100 employees. Log employment is the log of total employees of the firm. SOEpc is the percentage of firm ownership in government hand. 
Exporter takes value one if the firm exports. Log firm age is the log of number of year since establishment of firm.  Manager’s education level 
takes the following values: 1. Did not complete secondary school 2. Secondary School 3. Vocational Training 4. Some university training 5. 
Graduate degree (BA, BSc etc.) 6. Post graduate degree (Ph D, Masters). Problem with tax rates, problems with corruption and Crime assess 
whether either are constraints on the growth of the company and take the following values: 0 = No obstacle 1 = Minor obstacle 2 = Moderate 
obstacle 3 = Major obstacle 4 = Very Severe Obstacle. Judicial strength is the answer to the following question: "I am confident that the judicial 
system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes." To what degree do you agree with this statement? 1. Fully disagree, 
2. Disagree in most cases, 3. Tend to disagree, 4. Tend to agree, 5. Agree in most cases, 6. Fully agree. Information sharing dummy equals one if 
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an information sharing agency (public registry or private bureau) operates in the country, zero otherwis . Depth of information sharing measures 
the information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of 
these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative 
information (for example, late payments, number and mount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual 
borrowers are distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 
2 years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for 
borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit 
information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial 
private sector by financial institutions divided by GDP. Bank concentration is assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial 
banks over the period 2002 to 2005. Total tax rate is he typical company tax rate as share of profits. Control of Corruption and Government 
Effectiveness are measured in 2005, with mean zero and standard deviation one, and are based on a large number of underlying institutional 
indicators. Demo branch is the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches 
per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. The pooled sample period is 2002 to 2005. The estimation is based on crss section data and includes a full set 
of industry and year dummies. The omitted variables ar  medium-sized city, domestic firms, and non-exporters. The marginal effects (dy/dx) of 
the regressions are presented. The marginal effect o  a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the 
dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedaticity-robust standard errors clustered 
for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4 Alternative measures of information sharing and more institutional controls 
 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 3 4 10 
Private bureau dummy -0.106          
 [0.007]***          
Public registry dummy -0.133          
 [0.004]***          
Public registry coverage (% adults)  -0.140         
  [0.003]***         
Private bureau coverage (% adults)  -0.096         
  [0.006]***         
Voice and Accountability   -0.062        
   [0.195]        
Political stability    -0.149       
    [0.105]       
Quality and Regulation     -0.028      
     [0.117]      
Rule of Law      -0.145     
      [0.034]**     
No. of registering procedures for 
new business       0.005    
       [0.308]    
Creditors right        -0.037   
        [0.006]***   
Number of legal procedures         0.005  
         [0.124]  
Rigidity of employment          0.040 
          [0.215] 
Depth of infoshare   -0.036 -0.048 -0.050 -0.054 -0.028 -0.050 -0.052 -0.028 
   [0.108] [0.058]* [0.027]** [0.038]** [0.105] [0.014]** [0.030]** [0.056]* 
Demo branch -0.040 -0.025 -0.045 -0.048 -0.044 -0.041 -0.037 -0.057 -0.031 -0.026 
 [0.006]*** [0.132] [0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]** * [0.005]*** [0.000]*** [0.019]** [0.101] [0.092]* 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
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Countries 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.157 0.147 0.151 0.155 0.147 0.147 0.148 0.153 0.149 0.149 
Log_likelihood -13,482 -13,597 -13,565 -13,458 -13,576 -13,574 -13,585 -13,302 -13,565 -13,583 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, 
what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number. The pooled sample 
period is 2002 to 2005. The estimation is based on cr ss section Tobit model and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. Private and public credit registry take on value one if a private or public credit 
registry exists. Private/public credit registry coverage reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a private/public credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit 
outstanding. The number is expressed as a percentage of the adult population. Creditor rights measures th  power of secured lenders in bankruptcy. No. of legal procedures is the number of steps to enforce a 
contract in the court. Total tax rate is the typical company tax rate as share of profits. Control of C rruption, Political Stability, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability and Quality of 
Regulation are measured in 2005, with mean zero and standard deviation one, and are based on a large number of underlying institutional indicators. Demo branch is the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 
people in 2003/2004. The regressions contain the sam  control variables as reported in Table 3. The margin l effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dep ndent 
variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5. Firm location and tax evasion 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Depth of infoshare -0.052 -0.047 -0.056 -0.055 -0.050 
 [0.015]** [0.051]* [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.023]** 
Demo branch -0.038 -0.042  -0.041 -0.038 
 [0.004]***  [0.006]***   [0.014]** [0.020]** 
Geo branch   -0.048   
   [0.057]*   
Smallcity x depth infoshare -0.029     
 [0.028]**     
Capitalcity x depth infoshare 0.021     
 [0.050]*     
Smallcity x demo branch  -0.019    
  [0.066]*    
Capitalcity x demo branch  0.021    
  [0.028]**    
Smallcity x geo branch   -0.023   
   [0.023]**   
Capitalcity x geo branch   0.022   
   [0.063]*   
Firm location x depth infoshare    -0.029 -0.027 
    [0.015]** [0.027]** 
Firm location x demo branch    -0.035 -0.026 
    [0.017]** [0.030]** 
Firm location x Private 
Credit/GDP     -0.007 
     [0.077]* 
Private Credit/GDP -0.144 -0.133 -0.097 -0.141 -0.137 
 [0.019]** [0.059]* [0.114] [0.011]** [0.028]** 
Bank concentration 0.096 0.076 0.073 0.098 0.087 
 [0.032]** [0.118] [0.128] [0.029]** [0.031]** 
Smallcity 0.052 0.034 0.053 0.057 0.050 
 [0.022]** [0.117] [0.009]*** [0.031]** [0.033]** 
Capitalcity -0.027 -0.037 -0.046 -0.050 -0.048 
 [0.138] [0.052]* [0.037]** [0.059]* [0.020]** 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
Countries 43 43 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.147 0.148 0.145 0.148 0.150 
Log_likelihood -13,586 -13,565 -13,585 -13,563 -13,562 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Thetax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number.  The pooled sample period is 2002 to 
2005. The estimation is based on cross section Tobit model and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. The small city dummy takes the 
value one if the firm is located in a city with fewr than 250,000 inhabitants, while capital city takes on the value one if the firm is located in the 
capital. Firm location takes the following values: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 million population; 3=City of 250,000-1million; 4=City of 
50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with less than 50,000 population. Depth of information sharing measure  the information contents of the credit 
information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of tese characteristics: (1) both positive credit 
information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for example, late payments, number and 
amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers a e distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade 
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creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are 
collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges 
from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availab lity of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate 
lending decisions. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financial institutions divided by GDP. Bank concentration is 
assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks over the period 2002 to 2005. Demo branch is the number of bank branches 
per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is t e number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. The marginal effects (dy/dx) 
of the Tobit regressions are presented. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 3. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is 
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed 
by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clu tered for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 6. Firm size and tax evasion 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Depth of infoshare -0.049 -0.037 -0.052 -0.050 -0.049 
 [0.016]** [0.056]* [0.017]** [0.018]** [0.021]** 
Demo branch -0.032 -0.043  -0.044 -0.040 
 [0.054]* [0.021]**  [0.023]** [0.036]** 
Geo branch   -0.042   
   [0.012]**   
Smallfirm x depth of infoshare -0.024   -0.020 -0.017 
 [0.030]**   [0.056]* [0.068]* 
Bigfirm x depth of infoshare 0.021   0.025 0.026 
 [0.052]*   [0.020]** [0.029]** 
Smallfirm x demo branch  -0.022  -0.026 -0.029 
  [0.122]  [0.017]** [0.022]** 
Bigfirm x demo branch  0.027  0.015 0.018 
  [0.032]**  [0.113] [0.141] 
Smallfirm x geo branch   -0.021   
   [0.019]**   
Bigfirm x geo branch   0.020   
   [0.126]   
Small firm x Private Credit/GDP     -0.004 
     [0.059]* 
Large firm x Private Credit/GDP     0.004 
     [0.108] 
Firm location x depth infoshare    -0.030 -0.024 
    [0.114] [0.106] 
Firm location x demo branch    -0.035 -0.029 
    [0.113] [0.129] 
Firm location x Private Credit/GDP     -0.007 
     [0.195] 
Private Credit/GDP -0.144 -0.141 -0.108 -0.104 -0.11  
 [0.018]** [0.024]** [0.131] [0.021]** [0.036]** 
Bank concentration 0.081 0.090 0.081 0.082 0.080 
 [0.120] [0.034]** [0.108] [0.054]* [0.062]* 
Smallcity 0.052 0.033 0.057 0.054 0.048 
 [0.013]** [0.119] [0.029]** [0.027]** [0.024]** 
Capitalcity -0.050 -0.049 -0.032 -0.047 -0.041 
 [0.037]** [0.034]** [0.121] [0.014]** [0.084]* 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
Countries 43 43 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.146 0.146 0.142 0.149 0.150 
Log_likelihood -13,571 -13,598 -13,590 -13,572 -13,519 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Thetax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number.  The pooled sample period is 2002 to 
2005. The estimation is based on cross section Tobit model and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. The small city dummy takes the 
value one if the firm is located in a city with fewr than 250,000 inhabitants, while capital city takes on the value one if the firm is located in the 
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capital. Firm location takes the following values: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 million population; 3=City of 250,000-1million; 4=City of 
50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with less than 50,000 population. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm has fewer than 20 employees, 
while Large firm dummy takes on value one if firm has more than 100 employees. Depth of information sharing measures the information contents of 
the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of these characteristics: (1) both 
positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for example, late payments, 
number and amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; (3) data from 
retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4)more than 2 years of historical data are distributed; (5) 
data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of inc me per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index 
ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to 
facilitate lending decisions. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financi l institutions divided by GDP. Bank 
concentration is assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks over the period 2002 to 2005. Demo branch is the number of 
bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. The marginal 
effects (dy/dx) of the Tobit regressions are presented. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 3. The marginal effect of a 
dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-
values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 7. External finance dependence, liquidity needs, industrial growth opportunities and tax evasion 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 External fin. Depend.(EFD) Liquidity needs Market-to-book ratio 
Depth of info share -0.050 -0.053 -0.049 -0.042 -0.056 -0.052 
 [0.011]** [0.017]** [0.061]* [0.031]** [0.014]**  [0.017]**  
Demo branch -0.043  -0.030  -0.024  
 [0.016]**  [0.014]**  [0.117]  
Geo branch  -0.047  -0.046  -0.034 
  [0.029]**  [0.002]***   [0.058]*  
EFD x depth of info share -0.020 -0.017     
 [0.029]** [0.086]*     
EFD x demo branch -0.014      
 [0.031]**      
EFD x geo branch  -0.012     
  [0.032]**     
EFD x Private Credit/GDP -0.043 -0.051     
 [0.021]** [0.032]**     
Liquidity needs x depth of info 
share   -0.059 -0.053   
   [0.003]*** [0.057]*   
Liquidity needs x demo branch   -0.029    
   [0.156]    
Liquidity needs x geo branch    -0.034   
    [0.005]***   
Liquidity needs x Private 
Credit/GDP   -0.051 -0.047   
   [0.002]***  [0.011]**    
Market-to-book x depth of 
infoshare     -0.054 -0.036 
     [0.014]**  [0.061]* 
Market-to-book x demo branch     -0.042  
     [0.016]**   
Market-to-book x geo branch      -0.049 
      [0.150] 
Market-to-book x Private 
Credit/GDP     -0.067 -0.063 
     [0.174] [0.071]* 
Private Credit/GDP -0.106 -0.091 -0.105 -0.106 -0.108 -0.140 
 [0.035]** [0.125] [0.117] [0.022]** [0.034]** [0.022]** 
Bank concentration 0.110 0.140 0.094 0.149 0.099 0.148 
 [0.053]* [0.032]** [0.126] [0.059]* [0.126] [0.032]** 
Smallcity 0.055 0.062 0.056 0.061 0.057 0.060 
 [0.027]** [0.023]** [0.029]** [0.024]** [0.031]** [0.022]** 
Capitalcity -0.043 -0.041 -0.052 -0.050 -0.051 -0.045 
 [0.031]** [0.120] [0.036]** [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.112] 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
Countries 43  43  43  43  43  43  
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Pseudo_R2 0.145 0.141 0.144 0.141 0.144 0.140 
Log_likelihood -13,542 -13,566 -13,555 -13,579 -13,547 -13,575 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Thetax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number.  The pooled sample period is 2002 to 
2005. The estimation is based on cross section Tobit model and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. Depth of information sharing 
measures the information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of 
these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information 
(for example, late payments, number and amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are 
distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial instituons, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of histor cal 
data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all lo ns of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect 
their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with h gher values indicating the availability of more cr dit information, from either a public registry or 
a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financial institutions divided by 
GDP. Bank concentration is assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks over the period 2002 to 2005. Demo branch is 
the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. 
The small city dummy takes the value one if the firm s located in a city with fewer than 250,000 inhabit nts, while capital city takes on the value one 
if the firm is located in the capital. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm has fewer than 20 employees, while Large firm dummy takes on 
value one if firm has more than 100 employees. Liquidity needs is measured by inventories over sales, which is the median ratio of total inventories 
to annual sales for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.  External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with 
internal funds for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.The market-to- book ratio is equal to median ratio of (Market value of equity plus 
the book value of debt)/total asset, for the US firms in the same industry during the period of 2002-205. The marginal effects (dy/dx) of the Tobit 
regressions are presented. The regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 3. The margin l effect of a dummy variable is calculated as 
the discrete change in the expected value of the dep ndent variable as the dummy variable changes from0 to 1. P-values are computed by the 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries and are presented in brackets.  *, **, **  represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 8. Three-way horse race: firm size, location, and industry characteristics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 














Firm size effects:       
smallfirm x depth of info share -0.027 -0.020 -0.028 -0.019 -0.027 -0.021 
 [0.019]** [0.026]** [0.024]** [0.050]* [0.022]** [0.026]** 
bigfirm x depth of info share 0.023 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.026 
 [0.026]** [0.057]* [0.004]***  [0.028]** [0.032]** [0.058]* 
smallfirm x bank branch -0.032 -0.025 -0.031 -0.023 -0.032 -0.025 
 [0.023]** [0.110] [0.001]***  [0.106] [0.004]***  [0.012]** 
bigfirm x bank branch 0.030 0.022 0.030 0.024 0.030 0.022 
 [0.057]* [0.023]** [0.002]***  [0.017]** [0.106] [0.011]** 
smallfirm x Private Credit/GDP -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 [0.172] [0.063]* [0.034]** [0.020]** [0.064]* [0.260] 
bigfirm x Private Credit/GDP 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 [0.029]** [0.056]* [0.011]** [0.103] [0.023]** [0.059]* 
Firm location effects:       
firm location x depth of info share -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.019 
 [0.115] [0.111] [0.128] [0.131] [0.226] [0.220] 
firm location x bank branch -0.022 -0.014 -0.019 -0.024 -0.026 -0.021 
 [0.233] [0.264] [0.118] [0.130] [0.359] [0.321] 
firm location x Private Credit/GDP -0.008 -0.007 -0.0 7 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 
 [0.296] [0.333] [0.204] [0.216] [0.158] [0.112] 
Industry financial characteristics:       
Industry fin. charact. x depth of info share -0.014 -0.013 -0.027 -0.026 -0.044 -0.048 
 [0.023]** [0.062]* [0.155] [0.036]** [0.018]** [0.122] 
Industry fin. charact. x bank branch -0.012 -0.010 -0.024 -0.016 -0.046 -0.026 
 [0.116] [0.017]** [0.004]***  [0.051]* [0.065]* [0.200] 
Industry fin. charact. x Private Credit/GDP -0.010 -0.012 -0.018 -0.019 -0.036 -0.024 
 [0.024]** [0.106] [0.058]* [0.046]** [0.143] [0.039]** 
Depth of infoshare -0.059 -0.055 -0.050 -0.052 -0.058 -0.054 
 [0.006]***  [0.016]** [0.074]* [0.067]* [0.006]***  [0.012]** 
bank branch -0.035 -0.035 -0.039 -0.037 -0.028 -0.025 
 [0.018]** [0.053]* [0.129] [0.023]** [0.146] [0.022]** 
Private Credit/GDP -0.142 -0.147 -0.120 -0.106 -0.142 -0.147 
 [0.050]* [0.061]* [0.298] [0.219] [0.029]** [0.038]** 
Bank concentration 0.158 0.148 0.152 0.141 0.158 0.149 
 [0.189] [0.075]* [0.032]** [0.023]** [0.061]* [0.058]* 
Smallcity 0.048 0.051 0.049 0.054 0.052 0.050 
 [0.005]***  [0.014]** [0.020]** [0.001]***  [0.031]** [0.026]** 
Capitalcity -0.036 -0.047 -0.035 -0.045 -0.036 -0.047 
 [0.022]** [0.082]* [0.037]** [0.026]** [0.054]* [0.016]** 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 
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Countries 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.148 0.144 0.147 0.144 0.147 0.143 
Log_likelihood -13,475 -13,509 -13,489 -13,523 -13,483 -13,520 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Thetax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number.  The pooled sample period is 2002 to 
2005. The estimation is based on cross section Tobit model and includes a full set of industry and year dummies. Depth of information sharing 
measures the information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of 
these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information 
(for example, late payments, number and amount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are 
distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial instituons, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of histor cal 
data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all lo ns of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect 
their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with h gher values indicating the availability of more cr dit information, from either a public registry or 
a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financial institutions divided by 
GDP. Bank concentration is assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks over the period 2002 to 2005. Demo branch is 
the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. 
The small city dummy takes the value one if the firm s located in a city with fewer than 250,000 inhabit nts, while capital city takes on the value one 
if the firm is located in the capital. Firm location takes the following values: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 million population; 3=City of 
250,000-1million; 4=City of 50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with less than 50,000 population. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm 
has fewer than 20 employees, while Large firm dummy takes on value one if firm has more than 100 employees.  Liquidity needs is measured by 
inventories over sales, which is the median ratio of total inventories to annual sales for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.  External 
dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.The market-
to- book ratio is equal to median ratio of (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total asset, for the US firms in the same industry during 
the period of 2002-2005. The marginal effects (dy/dx) of the Tobit regressions are presented. The regressions contain the same control variables as in 
Table 3. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy 
variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clu tered for countries and are presented in 




Table 9. Robustness test – using country-fixed effects 
 




Liquidity needs Market-to-book ratio 
Firm location effects:  
firm location x depth of info share -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 
[0.148] [0.139] [0.127] 
Firm location x demo branch -0.027 -0.021 -0.026 
[0.203] [0.106] [0.194] 
firm location x Private 
credits/GDP -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
[0.260] [0.201] [0.286] 
Firm size effects:  
Smallfirm x depth of info share -0.029 -0.025 -0.032 
[0.018]** [0.025]** [0.019]** 
Bigfirm x depth of info share 0.029 0.026 0.025 
[0.024]** [0.014]** [0.027]** 
Smallfirm x demo branch -0.034 -0.033 -0.038 
[0.023]** [0.010]** [0.026]** 
Bigfirm x demo branch 0.029 0.028 0.023 
[0.058]* [0.031]** [0.056]* 
Smallfirm x Private credits/GDP -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
[0.194] [0.030]** [0.211] 
Bigfirm x Private credits/GDP 0.005 0.006 0.004 
[0.031]** [0.012]** [0.027]** 
Industry financial characteristics:  
Industry fin. charact. x depth of 
info share -0.014 -0.016 -0.043 
[0.024]** [0.388] [0.021]** 
Industry fin. charact. x demo 
branch -0.011 -0.024 -0.038 
[0.161] [0.011]** [0.147] 
Industry fin. charact. x Private 
credits/GDP -0.012 -0.018 -0.032 
[0.027]** [0.046]** [0.029]** 
Smallcity 0.051 0.045 0.053 
[0.009]*** [0.023]** [0.017]** 
Capitalcity -0.036 -0.038 -0.038 
[0.023]** [0.036]** [0.025]** 
Observations 22,627 22,627 22,627 
Countries 43 43 43 
Pseudo_R2 0.208 0.207 0.207 
Log_likelihood -12,654 -12,659 -12,660 
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties 
many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in 
your area of activity reports for tax purposes? Thetax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered number.  The pooled sample period is 2002 to 
2005. The estimation is based on cross section Tobit model and includes a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Depth of information 
sharing measures the information contents of the credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have 
each of these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negative 
information (for example, late payments, number andmount of defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual 
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borrowers are distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 
years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ 
right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availab ity of more credit information, from either a 
public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Demo branch is the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 2003/2004. 
The small city dummy takes the value one if the firm s located in a city with fewer than 250,000 inhabit nts, while capital city takes on the value one 
if the firm is located in the capital. Firm location takes the following values: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 million population; 3=City of 
250,000-1million; 4=City of 50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with less than 50,000 population. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm 
has fewer than 20 employees, while Large firm dummy takes on value one if firm has more than 100 employees.  Liquidity needs is measured by 
inventories over sales, which is the median ratio of total inventories to annual sales for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.  External 
dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.The market-
to- book ratio is equal to median ratio of (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total asset, for the US firms in the same industry during 
the period of 2002-2005. The marginal effects (dy/dx) of the Tobit regressions are presented. The regressions contain the same firm-level control 
variables as in Table 3 and country dummies. The margin l effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of 
the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. P-values are computed by the heterosk dasticity-robust standard errors clustered 





Table 10: Panel data estimation results: Firm fixed effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Depth of infoshare  -0.055 -0.049 -0.026 -0.051 -0.039 -0.004 -0.027 -0.002 0.012 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.056]* [0.001]*** [0.008]** * [0.861] [0.059]* [0.877] [0.642] 
Private credit/GDP -0.29 -0.425 -0.382 -0.144 -0.212 0.593 -0.263 -0.362 0.485 
[0.013]** [0.007]*** [0.011]** [0.215] [0.139] [0.007]*** [0.061]* [0.035]** [0.048]** 
Bank concentration 0.034 0.038 0.019 0.027 0.042 0.000 0.012 0.027 -0.009 
[0.597] [0.548] [0.741] [0.664] [0.518] [0.996] [0.836] [0.643] [0.842] 
Firm size effects:       
smallfirm x Depth of infoshare -0.043    -0.043 -0.045 -0.031 
[0.000]***    [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
bigfirm x Depth of infoshare 0.013    0.017 0.013 0.012 
[0.183]    [0.063]* [0.120] [0.169] 
smallfirm x private credit/GDP -0.005    -0.017 -0.014 -0.005 
[0.945]    [0.826] [0.852] [0.946] 
bigfirm x private credit/GDP -0.057    -0.147 -0.04 -0.132 
[0.558]    [0.097]* [0.676] [0.124] 
Firm location effects:       
smallcity x Depth of infoshare 0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004    
[0.769] [0.586] [0.667] [0.510] [0.752]    
capitalcity x Depth of infoshare -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 -0.02 -0.018    
[0.328] [0.334] [0.406] [0.266] [0.331]    
smallcity x private credit/GDP -0.259 -0.172 -0.213 -0.179 -0.137    
[0.047]** [0.186] [0.068]* [0.161] [0.251]    
capitalcity x private credit/GDP -0.024 0.002 -0.021 -0.021 -0.032    
[0.859] [0.989] [0.870] [0.869] [0.792]    
Industry financial 
characteristics: 
      
ext fin dep x Depth of infoshare -0.004   -0.001   
[0.436]   [0.792]   
ext fin dep x private 
credit/GDP -0.250   -0.303  
 
[0.002]***   [0.000]***   
liquid needs x Depth of 
infoshare  -0.144   -0.206 
 
 [0.021]**   [0.003]***  
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liquid needs x private 
credit/GDP  -0.658   -0.218 
 
 [0.200]   [0.677]  
mkt-to-book ratio x Depth of 
infoshare   -0.023   -0.020 
  [0.013]**   [0.031]** 
mkt-to-book ratio x private 
credit/GDP   -0.463   -0.460 
  [0.000]***    [0.000]***  
Observations 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 1794 
no. of countries  26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Number of firms 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 935 
Adj R2 0.132 0.137 0.184 0.154 0.143 0.320 0.209 0.200 0.347 
Log likelihood 1951.752 1958.712 2011.473 1975.346 1963.536 2171.856 2039.519 2029.7 2212.452 
Robust p values in brackets       
Note: The dependent variable is tax evasion ratio, computed on basis of question c241 from the Enterprise Surveys: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully complying with taxes 
and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax purposes? The tax evasion ratio is equal to one minus the answered 
number.  The sample period is 2002 and 2005. The estimation is based on an OLS model and includes firm and year dummies. Depth of information sharing measures the information contents of the 
credit information. A value of one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan amounts and 
pattern of on-time repayments) and negative information (for example, late payments, number and amount f defaults and bankruptcies) are distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual 
borrowers are distributed; (3) data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, as well as from financial institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of historical data are distributed; (5) data are 
collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the 
availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. Demo branch is the number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people in 
2003/2004, while Geo branch is the number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 2003/2004. Private Credit to GDP is claims on non-financial private sector by financial institutions divided by GDP. 
Bank concentration is assets of three largest banks s a share of assets of all commercial banks over the period 2002 to 2005. The small city dummy takes th  value one if the firm is located in a city 
with fewer than 250,000 inhabitants, while capital city takes on the value one if the firm is located in the capital. Firm location takes the following values: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 
million population; 3=City of 250,000-1million; 4=City of 50,000-250,000; 5=Town or Location with less than 50,000 population. Small firm dummy takes value one if the firm has fewer than 20 
employees, while Large firm dummy takes on value onif firm has more than 100 employees.  Liquidity needs is measured by inventories over sales, which is the median ratio of total inventories to 
annual sales for US firms in the same industry during 2002-2005.  External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms in the same industry during 
2002-2005.The market-to- book ratio is equal to median ratio of (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total asset, for the US firms in the same industry during the period of 2002-2005.  
The regressions contain the same country control vaiables as in Table 3, plus the log of employment. P-values are computed by the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for countries 




Appendix Table. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Original Sources 
Firm level data   
Tax evasion ratio 
Question c241: Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in fully 
complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would you 
estimate the typical establishment in your area of ctivity reports for tax 





Tax evasion dummy 
 














Question c2071: Where are this establishment and your headquarters located in 
this country?  
(Enumerator, Please code as follows: 1=Capital City; 2=Other city of over 1 
million population; 3=City of 250,000-1million; 4=City of 50,000-250,000; 





























Problem with tax rates 
 
Question c218e: 0 = No obstacle 1 = Minor obstacle 2 = Moderate obstacle 3 = 





Problem with corruption 
 
Question c218o: 0 = No obstacle 1 = Minor obstacle 2 = Moderate obstacle 3 = 






Question c218p: Problem with crime, theft and disorder: 0 = No obstacle 1 = 











Question c246: "I am confident that the judicial system will enforce my 
contractual and property rights in business disputes." To what degree do you agree 
with this statement? __ 
1. Fully disagree, 2. Disagree in most cases, 3. Tend to disagree, 4. Tend to agree, 






Manager’s education level 
 
Question c271: What is the highest level of education of the top manager?  







2. Secondary School 
3. Vocational Training 
4. Some university training 
5. Graduate degree (BA, BSc etc.) 
6. Post graduate degree (Ph D, Masters) 
 




Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000,000 people 
in 2003/2004 
Beck, et al (2007) 
Geo branch 
Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 10,000 sq km in 
2003/2004 




Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks over the 
period 2002 to 2005. 
 
Beck, et al (2010) 
Information sharing 
The dummy variable equals one if an information sharing agency (public registry 
or private bureau) operates in the country, zero otherwise.  





Public credit registry 
A dummy variable that equals one if a public registry operates in the country 
during the sample period, zero otherwise.   






A dummy variable that equals one if a private burea operates in the country 
during the sample period, zero otherwise.   





Public credit registry 
coverage 
The public credit registry coverage indicator reports the number of individuals and 
firms listed in a public credit registry with current information on repayment 
history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. A public credit registry is defined as a database 
managed by the public sector, usually by the central bank or the superintendent of 
banks, that collects information on the creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or 
businesses) in the financial system and makes it ava lable to financial institutions. 
If no public registry operates, the coverage value is 0.





Private credit bureau 
coverage 
The private credit bureau coverage indicator reports the number of individuals and 
firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on repayment 
history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. A private credit bureau is defined as a private 
firm or nonprofit organization that maintains a database on the creditworthiness of 
borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system and facilitates the 
exchange of credit information among banks and financial institutions. Credit 
investigative bureaus and credit reporting firms that do not directly facilitate 
information exchange among banks and other financial institutions are not 
considered. If no private bureau operates, the coverage value is 0. 





Depth of Credit 
Information  
An index measures the information contents of the credit information. A value of 
one is added to the index when a country’s information agencies have each of 
these characteristics: (1) both positive credit information (for example, loan 
amounts and pattern of on-time repayments) and negativ  information (for 
example, late payments, number and amount of defaults nd bankruptcies) are 
distributed; (2) data on both firms and individual borrowers are distributed; (3) 
data from retailers, trade creditors, or utilities, a  well as from financial 
institutions, are distributed; (4) more than 2 years of historical data are distributed; 
(5) data are collected on all loans of value above 1% of income per capita; and (6) 
laws provide for borrowers’ right to inspect their own data. The index ranges from 
0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, 
from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.  





Number of legal 
procedures 
Number of legal procedures for contract enforcement 








Private Credit / GDP  a measure of private credit outstanding to GDP Beck, et al (2010) 




Total tax rate Total tax rate (% of commercial profits) Djankov et al. (2009) 
Creditor Rights  
 
The index measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy. A score of one is 
assigned when each of the following rights of securd lenders is defined in laws 
and regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, for a debtor 
to file reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral 
after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm. Last, management does not 
retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. 
The index ranges from 0 to 4. Higher value indicates stronger creditor rights. 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
 
Voice and Accountability 
 
The indicator measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media. The value of y ar 2005 is used in this 
study. Higher values mean greater political rights. 




The indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. The value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher 
values mean higher quality of public and civil service. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Rule of Law 
 
The indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  The value 
of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher values man stronger law and order. 




The indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or vi lent means, including 
political violence and terrorism. The value of year 2005 is used in this study. 
Higher values mean more stable political environment. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Quality of Regulation 
 
The indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote market competition and 
private-sector development. The value of year 2005 is used in this study. Higher 
values mean higher quality of regulation. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Control of Corruption 
 
The indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests. The value of year 2005 is used in this 
study. Higher values indicate better control of corruption. 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Industrial level data   
Liquidity needs 
 
It is measured by inventories over sales, which is t e median ratio of total 






The fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for US firms 








It is employed as a proxy of demand for loans, is equal to median ratio of (Market 
value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total asset, for the US firms in the 
same industry during the period of 2002-2005. 
 
Compustat 
(Graham, et al, 
2008) 
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